This paper considers a generalized panel data model of polychotomous and/or sequential switching which can also accommodate the dependence between unobserved effects and covariates in the model. We showcase our model using an empirical illustration in which we estimate scope economies for the publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S. during the period from 2001 to 2003.
Introduction
Sample selection is a common problem in empirical work. Unobserved heterogeneity among units in the data poses a further challenge for practitioners. However, the increased availability of panel data and some recent developments in the literature have alleviated these challenges. In the case of strictly exogenous covariates, Wooldridge (1995) , Kyriazidou (1997) and Rochina-Barrachina (1999) offer several ways to tackle both the selectivity and unobserved effects that are allowed to be correlated with covariates in the model. For a comparison of these methods, see Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007) .
The above panel data models, as well as their generalizations that followed later [see Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) and the references therein], largely focus on binary sample selection. However, in many instances researchers face selection (or regime switching) of polychotomous and/or sequential nature. Examples include production technology studies of the industries which contain fully specialized, partly specialized and integrated firms, studies of higher education decisions and many others.
To fill this void, we contribute to the literature by considering a generalized panel data model of polychotomous switching which also allows for the dependence between unobserved effects and covariates in the model. The model we consider can be thought of as a generalization of a standard switching regression model. We show that Wooldridge's (1995) estimator can be readily extended to the case of polychotomous and/or sequential selection. For consistency, our method requires strict exogeneity of covariates conditional on unobserved effects. We showcase our model using an empirical illustration in which we estimate scope economies for the publicly owned electric utilities in the U.S. during the period from 2001 to 2003.
Model
Consider a generalized panel data switching regression model with correlated unobserved effects:
where x r it and w r it are 1 × K r and 1 × L r vectors of exogenous covariates (which may overlap) 1 with corresponding conformable parameter vectors β r and γ r t . (α r i , ξ r i ) are individual-specific unobserved effects that are allowed to be correlated with right-hand-side covariates. The outcome variable y r it is observed only if the r th regime is selected. The regime selection (switching) is governed by a latent variable D r * it with observable categorical realizations: D it = r if the r th regime is selected. While the disturbances u r it and v r it are orthogonal to (x r it , w r it ), their distributions are however allowed to be correlated, namely E[u r it v r it |x r it , w r it ] = 0. We first formalize the regime switching equation (2.1b). For convenience, define x r i ≡ (x r i1 , . . . , x r iT ) and w r i ≡ (w r i1 , . . . , w r iT ). Assumption 1. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T and r = 1, . . . , R, the conditional mean of unobserved effects ξ r i in a regime switching equation r is a linear projection on w r i , i. it . This formulation of correlated effects is essentially the one used in (Wooldridge, 1995, p.124) . 3 One may alternatively permit L [ξ r i |w r i ] to take a more restrictive, but parsimonious, specificatioǹ a la Mundlak (1978) which restricts δ r t1 = · · · = δ r tT (e.g., Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010) . 4 We also note that, unlike Wooldridge (1995) who assumes a normally distributed error in the selection equation, we assume the extreme value distribution, which is dictated by a polychotomous nature of the choice set.
The latent variable D r * it in (2.1b) can naturally be thought of as measuring an individual's propensity to select the regime r. Hence, the r th regime is said to be selected if and only if
While one can treat the regime switching as a system of (R − 1) dichotomous decision rules, we follow an alternative approach by considering the former in the random utility framework. That is,
After substituting for D r * it in (2.4) from (2.1b) and making use of Assumption 1, we let 
Given that e r it is extreme value distributed, it follows that r it is multinomial logistically distributed over i with the corresponding marginal distribution Λ r (·):
For some strictly positive monotonic transformation J r (·), condition (2.6) is equivalent to
We can now look at model (2.1) as a binary selection model, for each given regime r. That is, we can essentially replace the regime switching equation (2.1b) for each r = 1, . . . , R with its equivalent under Assumption 1: where D r * it is a transformed latent variable such that D it = r if and only if D r * it > 0, i.e., condition (2.8) is satisfied. We follow Lee (1982 Lee ( , 1983 and consider J r (·) ≡ Φ −1 [Λ r (·)], where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf. The advantage of such a transformation is that the random error J r ( r it ) in (2.9) is standard normal by construction, which would later enable us to make use of the truncated moments of the standard normal. Incidentally, the use of Lee's (1982 Lee's ( , 1983 transformation as means of relaxing the normality in the selection equation has also been pointed out but not further developed in the panel data setting by Rochina-Barrachina (1999) .
We next formalize the treatment of unobserved effects in the outcome equations of interest as well as the dependence between the two disturbances in (2.1a) and (2.9), where the latter enables us to correct for selectivity bias in the outcome equations. 5 For convenience, we define r it ≡ J r ( r it ). Assumption 2. For i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T and r = 1, . . . , R:
Assumption 2 states that the disturbance u r it is mean independent of (x r i , w r i ) conditional on r it . The latter holds if u r it and r it are orthogonal to (x r i , w r i ), a standard assumption made in the sample selection models in the presence of strictly exogenous covariates. Unlike Wooldridge (1995) , we also condition the expectation of u r it on w r i , which is necessary because outcome and selection equations are permitted to have different covariates and non-zero cross-equation correlation between unobserved effects. Further, Assumption 2 does not impose any restrictions on temporal dependence of u r it or in the relationship between u r it and r it . We specify the linear projection of u r it on r it as 10) where π r t is time-varying to allow for temporal dynamics in the relationship between the two disturbances. A common alternative to (2.10) is the assumption of bivariate normality of the two errors which also implies linearity of the conditional mean of u r it (e.g., Lee, 1983) . Our assumption is however less restrictive.
In order to account for correlated effects in outcome equations, Assumption 2 (ii) specifies the structure of unobserved heterogeneity. We follow Wooldridge (1995) where we have used (2.10) and (2.11) in the first equality, and (2.8) and strict exogeneity of (x r i , w r i ) in the last equality. ρ r t ≡ (ψ r t + π r t ). Given that r it is standard normal by construction, the expected value term in (2.12) equals the negative of the inverse Mills ratio, i.e.,
where φ(·) is the standard normal pdf. The model can be consistently estimated in two stages. In the first stage, we estimate γ r t (and δ r t ) via maximum likelihood as specified in (2.7) performed for each time period t separately. The obtained estimates γ r t are then used to compute the selection bias correction term. In the second stage, we consistently estimate the main parameters of interest β r via pooled least squares performed on (2.12) that includes predicted inverse Mills ratios (for each regime r, separately).
Remark 1. One needs to account for the use of the predicted regressors in the second stage when computing standard errors for β r . Also, it may be of particular interest to conduct inference across equations for different regimes. We suggest following Newey (1984) and casting the model in a multiple-equation system GMM framework which permits the derivation of an asymptotic variancecovariance matrix for our two-stage estimator. Alternatively, paired (nonparametric) bootstrap can be employed.
Remark 2. For expository purposes, the covariates w r it and parameters γ r t in the regime switching equation (2.1b) are both assumed to be regime-varying. In practice, one needs to impose an identifying restriction on parameters to be regime-invariant for regime-varying covariates unless the latter vary with individuals only. That is, depending on the empirical application, the first stage is to be estimated via conditional, multinomial or mixed logit.
Remark 3. An obvious drawback of the regime switching formulation in (2.1b) is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) which may be hard to justify in a given application. The latter can be easily relaxed by reformulating the regime switching as a nested (sequential) process. . For more on the estimation of nested logit models, see Wooldridge (2010) . The modified switching regression model can then be estimated under the remaining assumptions in two stages as above.
Empirical Illustration
To showcase our generalized model, we estimate scope economies for an unbalanced sample of 117 electric utilities owned by local governments in the U.S. in [2001] [2002] [2003] . The data include firms of three types: (i) upstream -utilities that generate electricity, (ii) downstream -utilities that distribute electricity, and (iii) integrated -utilities that both generate and distribute electricity. All power generators use fossil fuel only.
In order to quantify scope economies, we first need to estimate production technologies for the industry. We employ the dual approach and estimate the underlying production technology using the cost function in which all covariates are exogenous as justified by economic theory. Given the nature of product and the government regulation, it is widely accepted that electric utilities treat output quantities, input (and output) prices as fixed.
We define the following two outputs: net electricity generated (y 1 ) and peak demand (y 2 ). The inputs are physical capital (x 1 ), fuel (x 2 ) and others (x 3 ) (including labor) with the corresponding vector of prices (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ). Here we opt for a parsimonious specification to avoid multicollinearity and to conserve degrees of freedom given a small sample size. The price of capital (w 1 ) is the sum of the interest rate on long-term liabilities and the depreciation rate. We compute the fuel price (w 2 ) by dividing the fuel expenses by the fuel consumption measured in British thermal units (BTU). We follow Arocena et al. (2012) and proxy the price of other inputs (w 3 ), which includes labor and other operating expenses, by the state index of average wages for all employees from the U.S. Census Bureau. Lastly, the cost (C) is defined as the sum of capital, fuel and operating expenses, where the latter includes generation, distribution, administrative and general operation and management expenses, customer accounts, customer service and sales expenses.
Given the three types of utilities, not all firms produce both outputs and make use of all three inputs in their operations. The three technological processes can be summarized as follows.
upstream:
That is, there are many observations in the data in which upstream and downstream utilities report zero values for some combination of x 2 , y 1 and y 2 . The latter is a "zero-value observation" problem common to studies of electric utilities that estimate a common technology (cost function) for all types of utilities (e.g., Arocena et al., 2012) .
However, the assumption of a common technology shared by utilities of all three types is quite unrealistic and unlikely to hold in practice. We relax it by allowing technologies to be type-specific and estimating the cost function for each of the three utility types separately: C 1 (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , y 1 ; β 1 ) for upstream, C 2 (w 1 , w 3 , y 2 ; β 2 ) for downstream and C 3 (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , y 1 , y 2 ; β 3 ) for integrated firms. Note that our approach does not suffer from the problem of having to deal with zero-value variables because they do not appear in the equations.
Lastly, we recognize that the utility type is likely to be a product of an endogenous choice made by firms, which we model explicitly. We condition the choice of the utility type on (the log of) regime-invariant total sales (S) and total revenues (R) to capture (exogenous to firms) demand.
We estimate the first stage via multinomial logit, where we restrict γ 1 t = 0 (upstream type) for the identification. We have explored relaxing the IIA assumption by formulating a (partly degenerate) nested two-tier selection: (i) specialized (upstream/downstream) vs. (ii) integrated utilities. We however have consistently failed to reject the null of multinomial logit, i.e., i = ii = 1.
Figure 1: Kernel Densities of Scope Economies Estimates
In the second stage, we use the translog form for the dual cost function, onto which we impose the symmetry and linear homogeneity (by dividing input prices by w 3 ) restrictions. To conserve degrees of freedom, we define correlated effects in both stages using Mundlak's (1978) specification, as discussed in Section 2.
We use the fitted generalized model to compute scope economies exhibited in the electric utility industry. Unlike what is customarily done in the literature, we do not compute the statistic at some arbitrarily chosen data point (such as mean or median) but rather compute scope economies using actual data for integrated firms. The observation-specific scope economies are computed as SE = C 1 (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , y 1 ; β 1 ) + C 2 (w 1 , w 3 , y 2 ; β 2 ) − C 3 (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , y 1 , y 2 ; β 3 )
Figure 1 plots kernel densities of the scope economies estimates from our generalized model (solid) as well as of the estimates obtained using two auxiliary (misspecified) models: (i) a model of heterogeneous technologies which estimated separate cost functions but ignores endogenous selection (dashed); and (ii) a model of common technology which fits one cost function for all types of utilities with zero-value observations set equal to 0.0001, as widely practiced in the literature (dot-dashed). The figure suggests that the models that fail to account for technological heterogeneity and endogenous switching tend to underestimate scope economies: kernel densities based on both auxiliary models are to the left from that based on our generalized model. We attribute this to selectivity and misspecification biases present in the former models. We also formally test for the presence of endogenous switching via a joint Wald test of H 0 : ρ r 1 = · · · = ρ r T = 0 for r = 1, 2, 3. The test rejects the null for upstream and downstream utilities with p-values less than 0.02. The corresponding median scope economies estimates from the three models (in the order used in the previous paragraph) are 0.31, 0.17 and 0.05. In particular, our generalized model predicts that integration of a power generator and a power distributor reduces cost by a median of 31%. The distribution of our estimates is consistent with findings reported in the literature (e.g., Kwoka, 2002) . However, kernel densities of the scope economies estimates in Figure 1 do not account for sampling errors associated with the estimation of models. Table 1 reports the breakdown of integrated electric utilities into three categories: Scope Diseconomies (SD), Scope Invariance (SI) and Scope Economies (SE). We classify a utility as exhibiting SD/SI/SE if its scope economies point estimate is statistically less/equal/greater than zero at the 95% significance level. Here we use a bootstrap two-stage, multiple-equation variance-covariance matrix obtained using 9,999 replications.
Based on our preferred generalized model, we find that as many as 50% of integrated electric utilities enjoy scope economies. The cost of the remaining half is invariant to the scope. The two auxiliary models however document a far worse picture, according to which 61% to 88% of integrated utilities exhibit scope invariance or, at worst, significant diseconomies of scope.
